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2 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
Anthony Watson appeals from the District Court‟s denial of his habeas corpus 
motion, made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he claimed that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for not requesting a multiple-conspiracies charge.  We will affirm.
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I. 
 On May 31, 2000, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Watson and 
thirteen others with conspiracy to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 
and other charges.  Watson was also charged with one count of possession of crack with 
intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of possession of 
crack with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
860.   
At trial, the government presented evidence that Watson and his co-defendants 
were part of an extensive conspiracy to sell crack cocaine in Philadelphia.  According to 
the government, the conspiracy began in 1998, and was masterminded by Anthony Davis, 
who supplied the crack that was sold at several different locations in the city.  The 
government alleged a number of connections between the conspirators, including 
exchanges of drugs and weapons, regular meetings, and consistent phone contacts.  
Presented with this and other evidence, the jury found Watson guilty of all three offenses.  
Watson was sentenced to life imprisonment by the District Court.  After an appeal, 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253, and 2255.   
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Watson was resentenced to 360 months imprisonment, a sentence affirmed by this court.  
See United States v. Watson, 293 F. App‟x 887, 890 (3d Cir. 2008).     
In January 2010, Watson filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  The motion raised four claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, all of which the District Court denied.  The District Court also declined to issue 
a certificate of appealability.  Watson appealed.  This court granted a certificate of 
appealability solely on Watson‟s claim that his trial counsel should have requested a 
multiple-conspiracies charge. 
II. 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s legal conclusions and review 
its factual conclusions for clear error.  See Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 
2002).  A defendant who asserts a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim must 
show that his/her attorney‟s representation “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness” as determined by “prevailing professional norms.”  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).  The defendant must also “overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action „might be considered 
sound trial strategy.‟”  Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).   
Watson has not overcome this presumption.  Instead of requesting a multiple-
conspiracies charge, Watson‟s counsel simply argued that Watson was an independent 
actor rather than a member of any conspiracy.  To pursue this strategy, Watson‟s counsel 
attacked the credibility of Watson‟s alleged co-conspirators, on whom the government 
depended to make its case.  He also emphasized that the government had little objective 
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evidence linking Watson to the conspiracy, pointed to the belated identification of 
Watson in the investigation, stressed that Watson had never been recorded by 
investigators, and highlighted the weaknesses of the government‟s pager evidence.  In 
addition, in both his opening and closing arguments, Watson‟s counsel drew attention to 
the problems with the government‟s case, and underlined the importance of reasonable 
doubt in the jury‟s decision-making process.2   
Watson‟s counsel made the reasonable choice of exclusively pursuing the 
independent-actor strategy.  Indeed, all of Watson‟s co-defendants, including two who 
were acquitted, relied on a similar strategy.  This strategy allowed Watson‟s counsel to 
avoid the complexity and possible confusion of a multiple-conspiracies charge, and to 
instead focus on Watson‟s conduct.  Although it may be “tempting . . . to second-guess 
counsel‟s assistance after conviction,” we must avoid the bias of “hindsight,” and 
“evaluate the conduct from counsel‟s perspective at the time.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689.  From that perspective, the decision by Watson‟s counsel to pursue the independent-
                                              
2
 Watson argues that his counsel‟s trial conduct was so poor that it was devoid of any 
strategy.  In particular, Watson claims that his counsel implicitly insulted Watson during 
his opening, misstated pager evidence, unhelpfully suggested that Watson was a minor 
player in the conspiracy, attacked the credibility of the wrong witnesses, and undermined 
his own credibility by challenging the weight of drugs obtained from Watson despite a 
stipulation.  The record does demonstrate that the performance of Watson‟s counsel was 
imperfect, but the Sixth Amendment “guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect 
advocacy.”  Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).  The imperfect conduct of 
Watson‟s counsel was not so extreme that it overcomes the presumption that he was 
applying a strategy.  Watson further argues that his counsel was ineffective because he 
failed to meet with him until two months before the trial.  Although the failure of 
Watson‟s counsel to communicate with his client is troubling, the problem appears to 
have been corrected, and there is no evidence that it hindered Watson‟s representation at 
trial. 
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actor strategy and not the multiple-conspiracies strategy met Strickland’s reasonableness 
standard, and did not violate Watson‟s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
III. 
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the ruling of the District Court denying 
Watson‟s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.    
 
